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T
he Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) is a 
comprehensive law that has leveraged trillions 
of dollars in loans, investments, and bank ser-
vices for minority and working-class neighbor-
hoods. The CRA was passed in 1977 in response to the 
refusal of some banks to make loans available in minor-
ity and working-class communities. Since that time, the 
CRA has placed a continuing and affirmative obligation 
on banks to help meet the credit needs of the local com-
munities in which they operate.2 Further, not only has 
the CRA successfully deterred discrimination in lending, 
but it has also required that banks proactively assess and 
serve community needs in a safe and sound manner.
Our nation faces a serious foreclosure crisis, caused 
in part by widespread irresponsible lending. Had the 
CRA been applied to independent mortgage companies, 
investment banks, and other nondepository financial in-
stitutions, it is likely that the nation would not be gripped 
by a foreclosure crisis. The mandate to serve communi-
ties with safe and sound lending has resulted in bank 
lending that is considerably less risky than independent 
mortgage company lending. While banks have failed in 
the midst of this crisis, their failure rate is dwarfed by the 
wholesale loss of independent mortgage companies. Of 
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the 169 institutions that ceased operations in 2007, 167 
of them were independent mortgage companies.3
In celebration of more than 30 years of its existence, 
this paper will describe the CRA’s accomplishments and 
the role of community organizations in the CRA’s public 
participation process. In addition, it will describe what 
steps should be taken to strengthen and update the CRA.
 
I.  How the CRA Works and the  
Role of Community Groups 
The CRA requires that one of four federal agencies 
conduct CRA examinations: the Federal Reserve Board, 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the 
Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), or the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The agencies also consid-
er the CRA performance of depository institutions when 
they apply for permission to merge.4 
A CRA exam evaluates the extent to which banks 
serve local community needs and assigns a rating based 
on the assessment of the bank’s service. Both the CRA 
exams and ratings are available to the public.5 Further, 
CRA exams differ by the asset size and type of banks. 
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most rigorous exams, while smaller bank exams are 
streamlined.6 
The federal agencies are required to consider public 
comments in issuing CRA ratings and rendering deci-
sions on merger applications, making the public partici-
pation process a vital component of the CRA. Comments 
on a bank’s CRA record often bolster the bank’s perfor-
mance. A few years ago, NCRC assisted one of its West 
Virginia members in commenting on WesBanco’s CRA 
exam, detailing poor performance in making loans to 
minorities and low- and moderate-income (LMI) bor-
rowers. Due in part to the comments, the bank nearly 
failed its CRA exam and in fact appealed its initial rating. 
While the bank ultimately passed its exam, the exam 
delay contributed to a significant slowdown in regulatory 
approval of a merger application submitted by the bank, 
motivating the bank to significantly improve its perfor-
mance as evidenced in future CRA exams.
The CRA merger application process has been an im-
portant venue for community groups to approach banks 
about the credit needs of LMI borrowers. CRA agree-
ments are often negotiated between banks and com-
munity groups during the merger application process. 
NCRC’s report, “CRA Commitments,” has documented 
that banks have made $4.6 trillion in CRA agreements 
and commitments to LMI and minority communities.7 
Since the publication of CRA Commitments, Bank of 
America pledged an additional $1.5 trillion during its 
takeover of Countrywide.8 Overall, banks make consid-
erably more home loans in geographical areas covered 
by CRA agreements than those that are not, as docu-
mented in a study conducted by Federal Reserve econo-
mists using NCRC’s CRA database.9 
II.  The CRA’s Record of Increasing Access 
to Bank Lending and Services 
The CRA has leveraged substantial amounts of loans, 
investments, and bank services for LMI communities. 
According to publicly available data analyzed by NCRC, 
banks and thrifts (depository institutions) have made 
373,404 community development loans totaling more 
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than $407 billion since 1996. From 1996 to 2007, the 
annual dollar amount of community development loans 
more than tripled—from $17.7 billion to $63.8 billion, 
respectively (see chart). 
The Treasury Department reports that CRA-covered 
lenders increased home mortgage loans to LMI bor-
rowers by 39 percent from 1993 to 1998. This increase 
is more than twice that experienced by middle- and 
upper-income borrowers during the same period.10 Like-
wise, a study conducted by the Joint Center for Housing 
Studies at Harvard University estimates that without the 
CRA, 336,000 fewer home purchase loans would have 
been made to LMI borrowers and communities between 
1993 and 2000.11
Moreover, the CRA’s effectiveness can also be mea-
sured by comparing the lending patterns of CRA-covered 
banks with those of lending institutions not covered by 
CRA exams. NCRC found that in 2006, depository institu-
tions extended 23.5 percent of home purchase loans to 
LMI borrowers, whereas non-CRA-covered lenders ex-
tended 21.5 percent. NCRC’s study “Credit Unions: True 
to Their Mission?” showed that over a three-year period, 
banks consistently outperformed credit unions in offering 
home loans to minorities, women, and LMI borrowers in 
a majority of states.12
Remaining true to its purpose of requiring banks to 
serve credit needs consistent with safety and soundness, 
the CRA is an important antidote to the predatory lend-
ing that has contributed to the foreclosure crisis. In its 
review of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) 
data, the Federal Reserve found that home loans issued 
by banks are significantly less likely to be high-cost and 
exhibit risky features. The Federal Reserve showed that 
34.3 percent of the home purchase loans issued by non-
CRA-covered lenders were high-cost loans in 2005.13 By 
contrast, only 5.1 percent of the home purchase loans 
issued by depository institutions and closely scrutinized 
on CRA exams were high-cost. In addition, from 2004 
to 2006, independent mortgage companies extended 
between 55 percent and 63 percent of the high-cost pig-
gyback loans. During the same time, depository institu-
tions accounted for between 20 percent and 25 percent 
of the high-cost piggyback loans.14
The CRA mitigates home foreclosures. CRA exams 
reward banks for foreclosure-prevention efforts by 
giving banks points on their Lending, Investment, and 
Service Tests. Activities that earn CRA points include 
counseling, modifying loans, and investing in funds that 
finance loan modification. CRA exams provide clear 
incentives for banks to make safe and sound loans and 
penalize them for making loans that are unfair and 
deceptive. 
III.  How to Improve CRA Exam Criteria
While the overall framework of the CRA has been 
successful, the following need to be reformed. 
A.  The geographical coverage of CRA exams. 
B.  Whether CRA exams consider the behavior of mort-
gage company affiliates.
C.  Consideration of minority borrowers and communi-
ties on CRA exams.
D.  Evaluations for considering branching on CRA 
exams. 
E.  Data limitations that reduce the effectiveness of CRA 
exams.
10   Robert Litan, Nicolas Retsinas, Eric Belsky, and Susan White Haag, The Community Reinvestment Act After Financial Modernization: A Base-
line Report, U.S. Department of the Treasury, April 2000.
11   The Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University, The 25th Anniversary of the Community Reinvestment Act: Access to Capitol in 
an Evolving Financial Services System, March 2002.
12   National Community Reinvestment Coalition, “Credit Unions: True to Their Mission?” 
13	 	Robert	B.	Avery,	Kenneth	P.	Brevoort,	and	Glenn	B.	Canner,	Higher-Priced	Home	Lending	and	the	2005	HMDA	Data,	Federal	Reserve	Bul-
letin, September 8, 2006. See also Traiger and Hinckley, LLP, The Community Reinvestment Act: A Welcome Anomaly to the Foreclosure Crisis, 
January 7, 2008.
14	 	Robert	B.	Avery,	Kenneth	P.	Brevoort,	and	Glenn	B.	Canner,	“The	2007	HMDA	Data,”	available	at	http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/
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If CRA exams become more rigorous in each of these 
areas, community groups and the public can participate 
more meaningfully in the CRA process. For example, if 
lending to minorities is considered by CRA exams, then 
public comments on lending to minorities become more 
relevant. Likewise, if CRA exam analysis of branching, 
home, and small business data becomes more robust, 
community groups will have more information with 
which to engage in substantive dialogue about banks’ 
CRA performance. 
A.  The Geographic Coverage of CRA Exams
The geographic locations covered by CRA exams 
consist of metropolitan areas or counties that contain 
bank branches. When Congress enacted the CRA in 
1977, banks received deposits and made loans through 
branches. While some banks still issue loans predomi-
nantly through branches, others make the majority of 
their loans through brokers and other non-branch means. 
Though the CRA regulation stipulates that assess-
ment areas include geographical regions containing 
bank branches, the regulation also states that assessment 
areas include other geographical regions in which the 
bank has originated or purchased a substantial portion 
of its loans.15 Despite this regulatory clause, the federal 
agencies usually adopt a narrow definition of assessment 
areas for banks or thrifts that issue most of their loans 
through nonbranch channels. For these banks, it is not 
unusual to encounter CRA exams that cover only the 
geographical area of the bank’s headquarters.
In 2007, NCRC identified several lending institu-
tions that engaged in questionable practices, including 
refusal to make loans under a minimum amount (usu-
ally $75,000 or $100,000), refusal to make loans to row 
houses, and failure to offer loans within entire cities. 
NCRC research revealed that four banks engaged in these 
practices. Tellingly, only 11 to 13 percent of the loans 
investigated were in the banks’ assessment areas.16
In addition to enabling discriminatory practices, 
narrow assessment areas defeat the the CRA’s objec-
tive of banks responding to community needs. In one 
recent case, an NCRC member organization in Penn-
sylvania was concerned about the impact of a large 
bank merger on the bank’s continued commitment to 
the organization’s city. The newly merged institution 
would in fact be the largest lender (measured by the 
number of home loans) in the city. Because the bank 
did not have a branch in the city and the city was not 
in a CRA assessment area, the bank declined to engage 
in substantive discussions about future collaboration. 
Although it had a major lending presence in the city, 
the bank was not encouraged by CRA exam proce-
dures to see how it could meet credit needs beyond 
home lending in that area. 
The proposals in the CRA Modernization Act of 2007 
address the inadequacies of assessment areas.17 Under 
this bill, if a bank has captured one-half of one percent 
or more of the local lending market, a CRA exam would 
designate the geographic area served by the bank as an 
assessment area. A procedure such as this would ensure 
that the majority of a bank’s loans and other financial 
activities are scrutinized by CRA exams. 
B.  Whether CRA Exams Consider the Behavior of 
Mortgage Company Affiliates
Under the CRA, banks have the option of including 
their nondepository affiliates, such as mortgage com-
panies, on CRA exams. Banks are tempted to include 
affiliates on CRA exams if the affiliates perform admira-
bly, but they will opt against inclusion if the affiliates are 
engaged in risky lending or discriminatory policies. This 
is counter to the essential purpose of the CRA, which is 
to ensure that the institution as a whole is meeting credit 
needs in a responsible manner. 
Four nondepository affiliates of banks were identi-
fied by NCRC’s fair-lending investigations (discussed 
above) as engaging in redlining or other discrimina-
tory practices. These four affiliates were not included 
on their affiliated bank’s CRA examinations. Current 
CRA examination procedures enable bank affiliates to 
engage in such practices undetected. The CRA Modern-
ization Act of 2007 would end this serious gap in CRA 
enforcement by mandating the inclusion of affiliates on 
CRA exams.
15	 	See	Section	345.41	of	the	FDIC’s	CRA	regulation,	available	at	http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/community/community/index.html.
16   Contact the National Community Reinvestment Coalition for more information regarding our fair lending investigations.
17	 	See	http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:h.r.01289	for	the	text	of	HR	1289,	the	CRA	Modernization	Act	of	2007.	Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Community Reinvestment Act
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C.  Consideration of Minority Borrowers and 
Communities on CRA Exams
On a CRA exam, lending to LMI borrowers and 
communities is examined in detail. A major part of the 
Lending Test consists of scrutinizing the percentage of 
a bank’s loans made to LMI borrowers compared to the 
demographics of the bank’s community and the per-
centage of loans made to LMI borrowers by the bank’s 
competitors. 
CRA exams have a fair-lending component that as-
sesses whether a bank discriminated by rejecting quali-
fied minority applicants or by steering minorities with 
good credit to subprime loans. While the fair-lending 
test is necessary, it does not assess whether banks are 
affirmatively making loans to minorities. In other words, 
a bank can employ nondiscriminatory policies but 
still make relatively few loans to minorities because it 
does not market to minority communities. If lending 
to minorities were an explicit criterion on CRA exams, 
then consistently low percentages of loans to minorities 
would contribute to a lower rating for the bank. 
Given the evidence of lending disparities by race, 
NCRC has called for CRA exams to explicitly examine 
lending and services to minority borrowers and com-
munities. NCRC’s “Broken Credit System” report shows 
that minority neighborhoods received larger percentages 
of subprime loans than predominantly white neighbor-
hoods, even after controlling for creditworthiness and 
other housing stock characteristics.18 Researchers came 
to similar conclusions about high levels of subprime 
loans in minority neighborhoods after controlling for 
creditworthiness.19Another NCRC study, “Are Banks on 
the Map?” found larger disparities in branching by race 
of neighborhood than by income of neighborhood in 
25 large metropolitan areas.20 Overall, it is probable 
that a consideration of lending and branching by race 
of borrower and neighborhood would lessen the racial 
disparities in access to bank services and loans. 
Prior to CRA regulatory reforms in the mid-1990s, 
CRA exams under “Assessment Factor D” would often 
assess performance of lending to minorities. An example 
of this approach is employed in the evaluation of Signet 
Bank, conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Rich-
mond in 1996. If the regulatory agencies do not reinstate 
lending and service to minorities as criteria on CRA 
exams, Congress should amend the CRA to add lending 
and service to minorities as provided in the CRA Mod-
ernization Act of 2007.
D.  Evaluations for Considering Branching on  
CRA Exams
Access to branches and deposit accounts is essential 
in order to assist people at low- or moderate-income 
levels in establishing savings and acquiring home and 
small-business loans. Furthermore, research conducted 
by the Federal Reserve demonstrated that banks offer a 
higher percentage of prime loans when they issue loans 
through branches than when they make loans through 
brokers.21 NCRC’s research for the Appalachian Regional 
Commission revealed that small-business lending is 
higher in rural counties with a greater number of bank 
branches.22
Because branching and access to basic banking 
services are vital to wealth building, the CRA Service 
Test should be rigorous and comprehensive, holding 
banks to a high standard of branching and service 
provision in LMI neighborhoods. Unfortunately, research 
has shown the contrary. A study conducted by the Center 
for Community Capital concluded that the CRA Service 
Test scores are likely to be inflated when low scores on 
the Lending Test and Investment Test confront banks with 
the possibility of CRA exam failure.23
18   National Community Reinvestment Coalition, “Broken Credit System.”
19   Paul S. Calem, Kevin Gillen, and Susan Wachter, “The Neighborhood Distribution of Subprime Mortgage Lending,” October 30, 2002. See 
also Paul S. Calem, Jonathan E. Hershaff, and Susan M. Wachter, “Neighborhood Patterns of Subprime Lending: Evidence from Dispa-





23   Michael A. Stegman, Kelly Thompson Cochran, and Robert Faris, Center for Community Capital, University of North Carolina, Creating a 
Scorecard for the CRA Service Test: Strengthening Basic Banking Services under the Community Reinvestment Act, 2001. Also see the Woodstock 
Institute,	Measuring	the	Provision	of	Banking	Services	for	the	Underbanked:	Recommendations	for	a	More	Effective	Community	Reinvestment	
Act Service Test, March 2007. Of the 14 banks in Woodstock’s sample with the highest scores on the Service Test, eight had branch distributions 
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Diminished attention to branching on CRA exams 
should be addressed. The regulatory agencies should 
construct clear and objective measures for comparing 
the distribution of branches with the distribution of LMI 
neighborhoods and people in those areas. The agencies 
should also collect data on the number and percent of 
deposit accounts in LMI neighborhoods so that CRA 
exams contain substantive analyses on the distribution of 
deposit accounts instead of simple assertions that banks 
provide services to LMI consumers. 
E.  Data Limitations that Reduce the 
  Effectiveness of CRA Exams 
CRA exams cannot effectively measure bank perfor-
mance if data are of limited quality. Federal agencies 
have used HMDA data in detail on exams, but further 
enhancements in the use of the data are necessary. 
The agencies provide detailed tables on home-loan 
lending. The narrative and tables on CRA exams sepa-
rately analyze home purchase, refinance, and home-im-
provement lending. This is necessary since the separate 
types of home lending respond to different credit needs. 
As proposed and rejected in 2004, the same pro-
cedure of separate analysis should apply to mortgage 
purchases.24 Purchases refer to secondary market activity 
involving banks buying loans from other banks and 
mortgage companies. Loan originations refer to loans 
made directly by a bank. If loan originations were ana-
lyzed separately from loan purchases, it would be more 
difficult for banks to manipulate CRA exams through 
the buying of loans made to LMI borrowers immediately 
before CRA exams.25
CRA exams should use the new pricing information 
in HMDA data to evaluate separately prime and high-
cost lending. Just as home-purchase and refinance lend-
ing respond to different credit needs, so too do prime 
and high-cost lending. Also, it is important to ensure that 
banks making both prime and high-cost lending offer a 
balanced product mix to LMI borrowers and communi-
ties. This objective can be achieved only if prime lending 
and high-cost lending are analyzed separately. 
While the major issue associated with HMDA data 
has been its use in CRA exams, the predominant issue 
regarding small-business data is that of quality. The fed-
eral regulatory agencies significantly lessened the quality 
of these data by exempting Intermediate Small Banks 
(with assets of $250 million to $1 billion) from require-
ments to collect and report it. As NCRC demonstrated 
in its report for the Appalachian Regional Commission, 
Intermediate Small Banks are an important source of 
credit for small businesses, particularly in rural areas and 
medium-size cities and towns. 
Periodic national surveys sponsored by the Federal 
Reserve consistently point toward the likelihood of 
discrimination in small-business lending.26 A powerful 
way to reduce disparities in lending is to provide pub-
licly data on the number of loans made to minorities and 
women. Yet, the CRA small-business data lack informa-
tion on the gender and race of the small-business owner. 
Rep. James McGovern introduced the Access and 
Openness in Small Business Lending Act of 2003 (H.R. 
1748), which would have required reporting the race 
and gender of the small-business owner and mandate 
additional demographic detail in the CRA small-
business data.27 In addition to passing a bill similar to 
McGovern’s, it is suggested that Congress either pass 
a bill or urge the regulatory agencies to reverse their 
decision exempting Intermediate Small Banks from CRA 
small-business data reporting requirements.
IV.  How to Improve CRA Ratings
Ratings on CRA exams are a critical element of the 
CRA process. Some banks issue press releases announc-
ing Outstanding ratings, while low ratings can damage 
a bank’s reputation. Ratings also figure prominently in 
24	 	In	2004,	the	federal	agencies	proposed	separate	data	tables	on	originations	and	purchases	only	to	abandon	this	proposal.	See	the	February	6,	
2004,	Federal	Register	for	the	proposal,	available	at	http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/04CRA.html.	
25   The quality of HMDA data on loan purchases should be enhanced. Currently, Regulation C (the Federal Reserve regulation that implements 
the	HMDA	statute)	requires	data	on	loan	purchases	to	include	the	census-tract	location	of	property	but	not	the	race,	gender,	or	income	of	the	
borrower. Banks should be required to collect the same information on borrower and neighborhood characteristics on loan purchases as they 
do on loan originations. Some banks collect complete information on loan purchases, while others do not. The rigor of CRA exams would be 
enhanced	if	data	on	loan	purchases	were	made	uniform.	See	12	Code	of	Federal	Regulations,	Part	203,	Section	203.4	for	the	data-collection	
procedure regarding purchases.
26   See NCRC’s Access to Capital and Credit for Small Businesses in Appalachia for a discussion of the literature and the Federal Reserve–spon-
sored	surveys	available	at	http://www.ncrc.org/images/stories/mediaCenter_reports/ncrc%20study%20for%20arc.pdf.
27	 	See	http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:h.r.01748.Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Community Reinvestment Act
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the merger-application process. If ratings are inflated, 
the CRA will not be able to realize its full potential in 
leveraging bank financing and services for LMI commu-
nities. Grade inflation makes it difficult for community 
groups and members of the public to discern important 
differences in banks’ overall performance and across 
assessment areas and component tests. Grade inflation 
therefore hinders the ability of community groups to 
comment meaningfully to banks and regulatory officials 
about various aspects of bank performance.
CRA Grade Inflation
The table below shows the current failure rate for 
banks has hovered between one and two percent in 
recent years (ratings of Needs to Improve or Substan-
tial Noncompliance indicate a bank has failed its CRA 
exam). When ratings first became public in 1990, more 
than ten percent of banks failed their CRA exams.28 For 
the five years thereafter, more than five percent of banks 
failed their CRA exams every year.
Banks improved their CRA performance over the 
years as they bolstered their efforts to make loans, 
investments, and services in low- and moderate-income 
communities. Yet, the low failure rate in recent years 
appears implausible. As discussed above, the Center for 
Community Capital demonstrated inflation in the CRA 
Services Test. In addition, Rick Marsico, in his book 
Democratizing Capital, reveals how quantitative criteria 
are applied in an inconsistent manner on CRA exams, 
suggesting that a number of CRA exams have ratings 
that cannot be justified.29
The CRA Modernization Act of 2007 contains a 
number of provisions that would help prevent grade 
inflation. The first is introducing more ratings. Currently, 
the CRA component tests (such as the Lending Test) have 
Outstanding, High Satisfactory, Low Satisfactory, Needs 
to Improve, and Substantial Noncompliance as possible 
grades. In contrast, the final rating on a CRA exam can 
be one of four grades: Outstanding, Satisfactory, Needs 
to Improve, and Substantial Noncompliance. The final 
Table: CRA Exam Ratings 1990 - 2007
28	 	See	http://www.ffiec.gov/craratings/default.aspx	for	the	database	on	CRA	ratings.
29   Richard D. Marsico, Democratizing Capital: The History, Law, and Reform of the Community Reinvestment Act (Carolina Academic Press, 2005).
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rating should also include High Satisfactory and Low Sat-
isfactory as possible grades. In this manner, the general 
public and the federal agencies would be better able to 
assess actual differences and gradations in performance. 
If a low CRA rating in an assessment area triggered 
requirements for a bank to improve its performance, a 
bank would be more likely to serve all geographic areas, 
including smaller cities and rural areas. The CRA Mod-
ernization Act of 2007 would require federal agencies 
to address low ratings and would require public input 
in this process. If a bank receives a rating of Low Sat-
isfactory or worse in any assessment area, it would be 
required to submit a CRA improvement plan to its regu-
latory agency describing how the bank intends to bolster 
its CRA performance in that specific area.30 The general 
public would also be able to comment on the submitted 
plan. After the agency approves the CRA improvement 
plan, the bank would be required to submit quarterly 
reports for public monitoring purposes.
Another important reform would be to make the rat-
ings appeal process transparent. The appeal process as 
currently structured is a one-sided affair enabling banks 
to secretly appeal ratings; this likely contributes to CRA 
grade inflation. Either banks should not have the right to 
appeal or appeals should be publicly announced with an 
opportunity for the general public to comment. 
The importance of the rigor of the CRA exam has 
increased since the largest banks in the country have 
become much larger and will likely be involved in fewer 
mergers in the coming years. The top four banks (the 
new Bank of America after the Countrywide acquisition, 
the new JPMorgan Chase after the Washington Mutual 
acquisition, the new Wells Fargo after the Wachovia 
acquisition, and Citigroup) now control an incredible 
52.8 percent of the nation’s bank assets equaling $7 tril-
lion.31 At least two of the largest banks, Bank of America 
and Wells Fargo, are now close to the ten percent 
deposit cap. In other words, each of them owns about 
ten percent of the nation’s deposits, meaning they cannot 
legally acquire other banks without divesting branches. 
Thus, since these banks are unlikely to undergo signifi-
cant mergers in the near and medium term, the major 
means to hold them accountable for CRA performance 
is through the CRA examination process. Ratings must 
therefore become more meaningful and community 
organizations should have increased opportunities via 
public improvement plans to recommend how the very 
large banks can bolster their performance in geographies 
where their CRA performance is relatively weak.
V.  Bolstering the Merger Application 
Process and Public Participation
The merger application process presents significant 
opportunities for federal agencies to enforce the CRA. 
Yet, the enforcement of community reinvestment obliga-
tions through the merger application process has been 
lacking over the last several years. 
In Congressional testimony in 2007, an official 
representing the Federal Reserve Board testified that the 
Federal Reserve Board has held only 13 public meetings 
on mergers since 1990. This is less than one meeting per 
year in an era in which consolidations have profoundly 
changed the banking industry. In addition, a Federal 
Reserve Board representative stated that since 1988 the 
Federal Reserve Board received 13,500 applications 
for the formation of banks, or the merger of institutions 
involving bank holding companies or state-chartered 
banks that were members of the Federal Reserve System. 
Yet, only 25 of these applications were denied, with 
eight of the denials involving consumer protection or 
community-needs issues.32
Previously, the OTS required that a meeting be held 
between merging thrifts and community groups when 
requested by a community group that had submitted 
written comments pertaining to the merger. This 
procedure needs to be implemented by all the agencies. 
Meetings, as distinguished from public hearings, usually 
involve a relatively small number of stakeholders, 
including regulatory officials, a few community leaders, 
30	 	The	concept	of	an	improvement	plan	builds	on	a	procedure	mandated	by	the	current	CRA	regulation.	At	section	345.43	of	the	FDIC’s	version	of	
the regulation, a bank with a less than Satisfactory rating shall allow the public to inspect a description of its efforts to “improve its perfor-




top holding companies appear to have incorporated the recent acquisitions such as JPMorgan Chase’s acquisition of Washington Mutual and 
Bank of America’s acquisition of Countrywide. 
32	 	See	http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/braunstein20070521a.htm	for	Ms.	Braunstein’s	testimony.	Revisiting the CRA: Perspectives on the Future of the Community Reinvestment Act
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and representatives of the merging institutions.
In addition to meetings, a public hearing should be 
held when regulatory agencies receive several requests 
from community groups or citizens for a public forum. 
Meetings allow for in-depth dialogue and debate among 
a handful of important stakeholders. However, public 
hearings become necessary when hundreds of citizens 
and community organizations wish to testify. Regula-
tory officials must afford them the opportunity to testify 
so that the officials can understand how important the 
banks are to the affected communities.
In addition to holding more frequent hearings and 
meetings, the regulatory agencies should also bolster the 
rigor of its merger approval process. Since merger deni-
als are rare, the quality of merger approvals becomes 
quite important in assuring continued community rein-
vestment. The agencies should increase the use of con-
ditional merger approvals that require banks to improve 
CRA performance or to institute nondiscriminatory and 
antipredatory lending safeguards. Even in a case when 
the merger is approved without conditions, the federal 
agencies can describe any significant deficiencies in the 
CRA and fair-lending performance, and then indicate 
that they expect the bank to rectify these deficiencies. In 
fact, an “expectations” section would be beneficial as a 
regular feature of merger approvals and CRA exams. The 
section would explain in which geographic areas and 
in which component tests the bank has weaknesses and 
would suggest how the bank could improve the shortfalls 
(including partnering with community organizations or 
introducing new products or marketing approaches).
Federal agencies should also alter their stance regard-
ing CRA agreements, since agreements have stimulated 
significant increases in responsible lending. They usually 
note in merger approval orders that CRA agreements are 
not required by the CRA regulation. In addition, they 
routinely note that they will not consider any CRA agree-
ments in the merger approval process.33 Instead, the 
federal agencies should either explicitly encourage CRA 
agreements or implicitly encourage them by extolling 
the benefits of collaboration between community groups 
and banks. 
VI.  The Adequacy of Federal Agency 
Antidiscrimination Reviews on  
CRA Exams
Evidence of discriminatory and illegal lending can re-
sult in downgrades of CRA ratings for banks if discrimina-
tion and illegal lending were widespread and the lender 
did not take action to end the practices. However, there 
is little evidence that the fair lending reviews of CRA 
exams are rigorously testing for discriminatory lending. 
In most cases, even for the largest banks, the fair-
lending section of the CRA exam reports in one to three 
sentences that the regulatory agency tested for evidence 
of illegal and discriminatory lending and that no such 
lending was found.34 Yet there is no discussion of what 
precisely had been done to reach its conclusion. 
In the past, agencies provided detailed descriptions 
in the fair-lending section of CRA exams under the 
“assessment factor” format of the exams. For example, 
under Assessment Factor F, which assessed evidence of 
discriminatory or illegal practices, the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Richmond in January 1996 conducted matched 
file reviews of more than 300 loan applications in a 
CRA exam of Signet Bank. The exam also described a 
regression analysis, which sought to determine if race 
was a factor in loan rejections. 
A substantive fair lending review, similar to the one for 
Signet Bank, provides the general public with confidence 
that the regulatory agency performed a detailed anti-
discrimination analysis. Based on their experience with 
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fair-lending tests described by the exam scrutinized spe-
cific lending products or practices that are problematic. 
Detailed descriptions of fair-lending reviews enhance the 
rigor of the examination process by increasing transpar-
ency and promoting informed public dialogue. 
Safety and soundness reviews should be integrated 
with the fair-lending review and the overall CRA exam. 
Examiners should disqualify from favorable consider-
ation on CRA exams any subset of loans, such as nontra-
ditional and subprime loans with multiple risky features, 
that exhibit delinquency and default rates much higher 
than industry averages.35 If such risky lending is wide-
spread, the CRA rating should be downgraded, especial-
ly if this type of lending targets LMI borrowers, minori-
ties, and other classes of borrowers protected by the Fair 
Housing Act or the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.
Although the great majority of institutions failing 
because of unsafe and unsound lending have been inde-
pendent mortgage companies not covered by the CRA, 
some of the failures were banks and thrifts.36 The CRA 
exams of two of these lenders, Fremont Investment and 
Loan and Indymac, do not discuss the safety and sound-
ness of their lending practices.37 In Fremont’s case, the 
FDIC issued a failed CRA rating on the exam after the 
FDIC issued an enforcement order requiring the bank to 
cease and desist from unsafe and unsound lending. The 
CRA exam preceding the enforcement order gave Fre-
mont Investment and Loan an Outstanding rating. These 
two cases illustrate that safety-and-soundness reviews 
need to be uniformly rigorous, with findings clearly dis-
cussed on CRA exams. 
VII. Less Frequent CRA Exams  
for Small Banks
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999 re-
duced the frequency of Small-Bank CRA exams. Under 
GLBA, Small Banks with assets under $250 million are 
examined only once every four years if they have a 
Satisfactory rating and once every five years if they have 
an Outstanding rating.38 In contrast, banks with assets 
above $250 million are examined every two years.
When Small Banks are examined infrequently, they 
have less incentive to adhere affirmatively and continu-
ally to their reinvestment obligations. They also have 
reduced incentives to make sufficient loans to low- and 
moderate-income borrowers during the four- or five-
year period between exams, and they may focus their 
efforts only during the last year or two before their 
exams. Increasing the frequency of Small Bank exams 
is necessary when considering that CRA exams are usu-
ally the only accountability mechanism, as Small Banks 
rarely merge.39
VIII. The Need to Extend the CRA to 
Nonbank Financial Institutions
In the 30 years since the enactment of the CRA, the 
financial industry has evolved incredibly. Banks now 
face more formidable competitors than they did in 1977. 
As long as these competitors remain uncovered by the 
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sound than the banks and/or that they will offer a smaller 
portion of loans than banks to low- and moderate-
income communities. Credit unions and independent 
mortgage companies do not offer as high a percentage 
of home loans to LMI borrowers as banks. NCRC’s fair-
lending investigation, discussed above, revealed that 
26 of the 35 institutions engaged in redlining and other 
discriminatory practices were independent mortgage 
companies not covered by the CRA. 
Congress needs to follow the example of the state of 
Massachusetts, which has covered credit unions with the 
CRA for a number of years and also recently enacted a 
community reinvestment requirement for mortgage com-
panies. Similarly, the CRA Modernization Act of 2007 
would require the application of the CRA to independent 
mortgage companies, and it would also require the ap-
plication of the CRA to insurance companies by impos-
ing HMDA-like data-disclosure requirements. A number 
of states already collect and provide data on insurance 
provision to the general public.40 
Moreover, the CRA Modernization Act of 2007 
would require the application of the CRA to securities 
firms. CRA exams would measure the extent to which 
securities firms are serving LMI and minority consumers. 
Wealth building would be augmented considerably 
if more people of modest means and minorities had 
access to mutual funds and similar products. In addition, 
if a law channeled more securities firm investments 
into minority and working-class neighborhoods, the 
economic development prospects of these communities 
would be significantly enhanced. 
IX. Conclusion
In light of the present-day lending crisis and its dispa-
rate impact on minority and LMI communities, the CRA 
needs to be modernized and enhanced. The CRA has been 
effective in bringing trillions of dollars in loans, invest-
ments, and services to LMI communities, yet too many LMI 
and minority communities are still left out of the financial 
mainstream. If America is to become a truly financially 
inclusive society, the application of the CRA to banks by 
federal agencies needs to be strengthened. In addition, the 
CRA needs to be applied to nonbank financial institutions. 
The CRA’s effectiveness will be bolstered further if reforms 
are initiated that facilitate community participation.
In summary, the following steps need to be taken:
Improve CRA Exam Criteria
•  Assessment area procedures must be reformed so that 
a great majority of a bank’s loans are on CRA exams.
•  All nondepository affiliates of banks must be includ-
ed on CRA exams.
•  CRA exams should explicitly consider lending, 
investments, and services to minority borrowers and 
communities.
•  Federal agencies need to enhance the rigor of the 
Service Test and increase data collection of bank 
deposit accounts (at least by income level) of neigh-
borhoods. The Community Development Test for 
Intermediate Small Banks must also examine branch-
ing and deposit accounts more strenuously.
•  CRA exams should separately consider purchases 
and loan originations, as well as prime and high-cost 
lending. 
•  The quality of CRA small-business data needs to be 
enhanced through the disclosure of the race and 
gender of the small-business owner.
Improve CRA Ratings
•  CRA grade inflation needs to be counteracted by 
increasing the number of possible ratings. 
•  The ratings appeals process should be either nullified 
or made transparent with an opportunity for public 
comment.
•  Low scores for any assessment area should trigger 
regulatory enforcement, including the submission of 
improvement plans.
•  The rigor of CRA exams must increase, particularly 
for the largest banks, which are now less likely to 
merge. CRA exams thus become the major means of 
CRA enforcement for the new megabanks.
Bolster the Merger Application Process  
and Public Participation
•  The agencies should hold more public hearings on 
merger applications and issue more conditional 
merger approvals.
•  Merger approvals and CRA exams need to contain 
an “expectations” section detailing specific 
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improvements the agencies expect banks to 
undertake. Even in cases of merger approvals and 
passing CRA grades, balanced and comprehensive 
discussions in “expectations” sections could motivate 
enhanced lending, investing, and services by banks.
Bolster Federal Agency Antidiscrimination Reviews
•  The CRA’s scrutiny of illegal and predatory lend-
ing practices should become more transparent and 
rigorous. 
•  Safety and soundness exams should be integrated 
with fair-lending reviews and CRA exams.
•  Increase the frequency of Small Bank CRA Exams.
•  The stretch-out of the Small Bank CRA exam cycle 
needs to be eliminated. Small banks should be exam-
ined as frequently as Large Banks.
•  Extend the CRA to Cover Nonbank Institutions, 
Including credit unions, securities companies, 
mortgage companies, insurance firms, and 
investment banks. 
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